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The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), irst proposed by China in 
October 2013, opened for business in January 2016. The AIIB is not only a 
bank it is also part of the new ݳassertiveݴ foreign policy line. After the going 
out strategy starting in 2000 China emerged as a global player building 
alliances, signing bilateral cooperation treaties and FTAs especially with the 
Asian neighbor states. With the assumption of oice of the Xi Jinping admin-
istration in 2013 this well-prepared popular dream of renewed national 
greatness was translated into policy.
Another step on this path was the formation of 
the 40 billion USD ݳSilk Road Fundݴ in Novem-
ber 2014, which inances new infrastructure 
projects along the sea- and land corridors in 
Eurasia. The AIIB is meant to support the ݳSilk 
Road fundݴ. Also in 2014, Wang Jisi, the Dean of 
the School of International Studies at Peking 
University, published several articles on the 
geo-strategical necessity of ݳChinas march to 
the West (Xi Jin). In March 2015 the Chinese 
government published the Doc. ݳVision and Ac-
tions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic 
Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Roadݴ 
(NDRC et al. 2015, known as OBOR One-Belt-
One-Road).
OBOR is a redesign of formerly unrelated or in-
dependent regional strategies which are now 
summarized in one conceptual design. The rhet-
oric seeks to signal the peaceful intention as 
revitalizing old trading routes instead of he-
gemonic policies. After the collapse of the So-
viet Union, China had to redeine its relation-
ship with the region, esp. the new three states 
Kirgizstan, Kazakhstan and Tadzhikistan. There-
fore, in 1996 it launched the Shanghai-Five-
Groupݴ (China, Russia, three new states). In 
2001, this group developed into the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, which also includes 
Uzbekistan, India and Pakistan are acceding 
states and several other states are observer 
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states or dialogue partners. Together with the 
Russian ݳEurasian Economic Unionݴ it forms a 
very powerful economic alliance.
Secondly, since 2009, China is leading the 
16+1-Initiative which aims to establish a re-
gional mechanism to cooperate with 11 EU 
Member States and 5 candidate EU accession 
countries from Southeastern Europe. In June 
2015 at the EU-China-summit in Brussels both 
sides decided to cooperate in the funding of a 
joint EU-connectivity platform which corre-
sponds perfectly with the Chinese geo-strategi-
cal plans.
Thirdly, OBOR extrapolated the Bangladesh-Chi-
na-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM 
EC). In 2013 China, India, Bangladesh and My-
anmar agreed to build this corridor to optimize 
the infrastructure between Northeast India, 
Bangladesh, Myanmar and southwest China, 
which was blocked for many decades.
But Xi’s OBOR strategy is also a reaction to the 
ݳrebalancing Asiaݴ policy of Barack Obama 
which was announced by Washington in 2011 
under the term ݳNew Silk Roadݴ. This strategy 
was aimed at maintaining Washington’s primacy 
in the Asia-Paciic region by using trade instru-
ments like TPP. When Xi came to power, he 
launched his own vision for a China-led Silk 
Road that would streamline foreign trade, en-
sure stable energy supplies, promote Asian in-
frastructure development, and consolidate Bei-
jing’s regional inluence meaning closer cooper-
ation with the bigger region of Eurasia and 
Southeast Asian neighboring countries.
The formation of the AIIB has to be seen in this 
context. It provides inancing for huge infra-
structure projects in South East Asia and coun-
tries along the Silk Road route in South Asia, 
Central Asia, the Caucasus and the periphery 
of Europe. The route from Central Asia to Eu-
rope is designed to strengthen trade and in-
vestment relations. A ݳsecond silk roadݴ is to 
be established via sea routes along the coastal 
line of Southeast Asia to the South Chinese Sea 
or alternatively through South Paciic to Eu-
rope.
European membership  
inside AIIB
European membership in the AIIB was critical 
to Beijing’s ambition of heading an international 
institution, and not merely a regional one. Once 
the UK announced its intention to join the AIIB 
in March 2015, Germany and a host of other 
European nations, among them Austria and 
Switzerland, followed.
Their membership was vital because the United 
States, Japan and Canada, all G 7 members, did 
not. While the U. S. may have been preoccupied 
with the extension of China’s ݳsoft powerݴ, it 
explained its reluctance to join with the lack of 
transparent governance, environmental and so-
cial standards. Indeed, the US Congress would 
hardly have approved funding for the AIIB in the 
absence of such standards.
Facing no such parliamentary hurdles, Euro-
pean governments took the view that their 
membership would enable them to inluence 
standard setting at the AIIB. In its press release 
announcing that Germany had joined the AIIB 
as a founding member, the German Ministry of 
Finance stated that it would work to obtain the 
best international standards and practices at 
the AIIB (17 March 2015).
As with other large investments in infrastruc-
ture, these would have to include transparent 
decision-making, public access to information 
on AIIB projects in the pipeline and under im-
plementation, public consultation processes and 
efective monitoring of the implementation of 
environmental and social standards.
However, a lack of transparency and an inade-
quate public consultation process have marred 
the establishment of the AIIB’s Environmental 
and Social Framework (ESF). Its policy on 
public access to information also falls short of 
the practice of disclosing information publicly at 
other multilateral inancial institutions.
Upon ratifying German membership in the AIIB, 
the Parliamentary Committee on Finance passed 
a joint resolution calling on the Government to 
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demand that the AIIB establish environmental, 
social and transparency policies that are at a 
minimum equivalent to those at other institu-
tions, such as the World Bank. Parliament will 
now have to require regular reporting on the 
progress made and on the sound use of Germa-
ny’s inancial contribution to the AIIB.
During its irst year of operation, the AIIB plans 
to engage mainly in co-inancing operations 
with other multilateral banks. This may leave 
some of the hard questions for later when the 
AIIB has more irmly established itself and ob-
tained its Triple A credit rating,
The AIIB’s Social and  
Environmental Standards 
and the risk of locking in 
fossil fuel technology
Jin Liqun, president of the new inancial institu-
tion set up to provide inancing for infrastruc-
ture projects along the Silk Road route, has de-
clared that the AIIB will be a lean, clean, and 
green’ institution which upholds the highest 
standards of 21st century governance. Early 
doubts, though, hang over these aspirations.
The inal review of the AIIB’s draft Environmen-
tal and Social Framework (ESF) was concluded 
in March 2016 behind closed doors. Also, guide-
lines to public access to information were con-
cluded in March 2016. It foresees no provision 
of public information on projects inanced by 
the AIIB before approval.
While the draft ESF contains all the trendy buzz 
words, such as transparency and accountability, 
it lacks clear mandatory requirements. There 
are too many exception clauses and loopholes.
AIIB clients will be asked to meet the standards 
in a manner and time frame acceptable to the 
Bank, which allows for too much discretion of 
Bank management whose primary incentives 
will be to make loans, and not to ensure sustain-
able outcomes. There will also be the option for 
clients, both governments and private compa-
nies, to simply use their own standards instead 
of those of the AIIB. However, there is no clarity 
on how the AIIB will assess that the clients’ 
standards are equivalent to its own.
Yet they chime with China’s previous suggestion 
that a technical panel will make expert deci-
sions on AIIB funded projects rather than the 
AIIB’s board with the guidance of an internal 
sector investment policy.
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What remains critically missing is a sector in-
vestment policy for fossil fuels, or an analysis of 
the known and irreversible environmental, so-
cial and health risks speciic to coal, enabling 
quantiication and avoidance strategies that 
could ofer guidance on the viability and pru-
dence of planned coal projects.
Lenders such as the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) have agreed to identify projects for co-i-
nancing with the AIIB, while the European Bank 
of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
says it will be ready to present the AIIB with 
several projects ripe for immediate co-inancing 
from 2017.
The European Bank of Reconstruction and De-
velopment, the World Bank, as well as the Euro-
pean Investment Bank all have adopted climate 
and energy policies in recent years which limit 
their funding of highly polluting coal-ired 
power plants. Some shareholder countries of 
these public development banks which have ef-
fectively stopped inancing coal projects are 
also founding members of the AIIB, including 14 
EU member states. While the non-regional/ Eu-
ropean members of the AIIB only represent 
25 % of the total shareholders, it is unclear 
whether the EU countries have acted during the 
AIIB’s set-up negotiations to support restricted 
inancing of unabated coal projects, consistent 
with the policies they have supported at the 
other multi-laterals. Regrettably, the apparent 
lack of tough talking on the issue of coal at the 
AIIB negotiating table would suggest that policy 
incoherence can be tolerated. China, India, and 
Indonesia are coal friendly.
Jin Liqun has gone on the record to suggest that 
coal power is a human rights issue for people liv-
ing in poor countries with no access to power, and 
that the AIIB therefore ought to make exceptions 
for the funding of new coal. However, a recent 
study from the Overseas Development Institute 
(one of many published recently) shows that in 
practice new generation capacity does not trans-
late directly into new electricity connections or – 
even – lower prices for existing poor consumers. 
In short, the construction of new coal plants is no 
silver bullet for solving energy poverty.
Even before the conclusion of the environmen-
tal and social standards and even prior to the 
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) is dedicated to providing inancing for 
big ticket infrastructure projects in energy 
and transport sectors in South Asia, Central 
Asia, the Caucasus and the periphery of Eu-
rope. Furthermore, the AIIB is the helping 
hand for the urgency to export Chinas over 
production.
The China-led bank has emerged as a multi-
lateral institution with the backing of 57 
members in record time. Among the found-
ing members are Bangladesh, Cambodia, 
India, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philip-
pines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and 
China (with almost 30 percent of the shares 
China is the largest shareholder and can 
veto any decision). Taiwan applied but was 
rejected. The AIIB has an initial authorized 
capital of $100 billion, 75 % of which will 
come from Asian and Oceanian countries.
According to the AIIB’s charter (Articles of 
Agreement), its Board of Directors is com-
posed of 12 members of whom 3 members 
will represent non-regional countries. Both 
the UK and Germany obtained one of these 
coveted directorships, with Germany repre-
senting Euro-Zone members, and the UK 
those outside the Euro-Zone. Each director 
has voting shares proportional to the inan-
cial contribution of the member states he/ 
she represents. Since non-regional shares 
are limited to 25 %, which includes Brazil, 
Egypt and South Africa, the 17 European 
member states will together have slightly 
above 20 % of voting shares. Germany with 
above 4 % of the shares is the largest non-re-
gional contributor.
The role of non-resident Board of Directors 
is to establish AIIB policies and supervise 
management and operations on a regular 
basis. What remains unclear is what role the 
Board will play in overseeing projects in the 
Bank’s pipeline, reviewing environmental 
impact assessments and in deciding on indi-
vidual investments. An initial AIIB proposal 
that all investments up to USD 500 million 
should be signed of only by the Bank’s pres-
ident has apparently met with some Euro-
pean resistance, although it is not known 
whether a new threshold has been set.
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Folgende China-Blickwechsel (früher Hintergrundinformationen) sind bisher erschienen 
und stehen als Download unter den angegebenen Adressen zur Verfügung:
  Zivilgesellschaft in Taiwan (II), Soziale Bewegungen in Taiwan am Beispiel der 
Arbeiter-, Frauen- und Agrarbewegung (2016); http:// www.eu-china.net/ eigene-
publikationen/ #c798
  The new China-led investment bank AIIB and its geo-strategical meaning 
(2016), Korinna Horta, Wawa Wang, Nora Sausmikat; http:// www.eu-china.net/ eigene-
publikationen/ #c798
  Investitionsschutzabkommen mit China. Handelsabkommen als Instrument der 
Geopolitik (2016), Klaus Fritsche; http:// www.eu-china.net/ materialien/ blickwechsel-
investitionsschutzabkommen-mit-china-handelsabkommen-als-instrument-der-geopo-
litik/ 
  Menschenrechte in China: Was hat sich seit der Verfassungsänderung im Jahr 
2004 getan? (2015), Annika Tomzak; http:// www.eu-china.net/ materialien/ blickwech-
sel-menschenrechte-in-china-was-hat-sich-seit-der-verfassungsaenderung-im-jahr-
2004-getan/
  Soziale und ökologische Auswirkungen chinesischer Aktivitäten in Myan-
mar. Aus Sicht der chinesischen Zivilgesellschaft (2015), Nora Sausmikat, (auch als 
Burma-Brieing 2015/3 erscheinen); http:// www.eu-china.net/ materialien/ soziale-und-
oekologische-auswirkungen-chinesischer-aktivitaeten-in-myanmar-aus-sicht-der-chi-
nesischen-zivilgesellschaft/ 
  Zivilgesellschaft in Taiwan (I), Julian Rothkopf, Schriftenreihe Asienhaus-Hinter-
grundinformationen, 14/2014; http:// www.eu-china.net/ materialien/ hintergrundinfor-
mationen-zivilgesellschaft-in-taiwan/ 
  Chinese Investments in Myanmar – The Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline pro-
ject could become a chess piece (2014), Ying Hongwei, http:// www.eu-china.net/ 
materialien/ chinese-investments-in-myanmar-the-sino-myanmar-oil-and-gas-pipeline-
project-could-become-a-chess-piece/ 
  Secret »Document No. 9«: New Chinese Leadership’s Attack on Western Inluence 
(2014), Theo Westphal, http:// www.eu-china.net/ materialien/ secret-document-no-
9-new-chinese-leaderships-attack-on-western-inluence/ 
Die China-Blickwechsel sind eine Schriftenreihe des China-Programms der Stiftung Asi-
enhaus und werden zurzeit von der Stiftung Umwelt und Entwicklung Nordrhein-Westfalen 
gefördert.
Folgende Broschüren sind erschienen:
Sustainable agriculture in China: Land policies, food and farming issues, 60 S., 5 €, mit 
Beiträgen von Jiang Yifan, René Trappel, Chan Shun-hing, Sabine Ferenschild, Evan Ellis, 
Adrian Ely, Sam Geall, Yiching Song, Nora Sausmikat
Chinas Bedeutung für eine Politik der globalen Nachhaltigkeit wächst stetig, auch 
im Bereich der Landwirtschaft. Die Broschüre will MultiplikatorInnen der entwicklungs- 
und umweltpolitischen sowie der gewerkschaftlichen Bildungsarbeit in die Lage versetzen, 
sich diferenziert mit der Rolle Chinas für eine globale nachhaltige Landwirtschaft auseinan-
dersetzen zu können.
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appointment of the Bank’s Board, the AIIB had 
as early as 2015, leapt into the process of lining 
up its project pipeline for 2016, including nam-
ing infrastructure projects in Pakistan as forth-
coming investments for the institution. Already 
back in November 2015, an official from Indo-
nesia’s Ministry of Finance was quoted praising 
the AIIB’s readiness to provide USD 1 billion in 
loans to Indonesia over the next four years, in-
cluding for coal-ired power projects. This was 
backed up by a reported assertion that  AIIB 
imposes looser environmental requirement in 
disbursing its loans, making it the preferred 
creditor for inancing Indonesia’s coal-ired 
power plant projectsݴ. This statement was re-
tracted and replaced with AIIB – as opposed to 
other multilateral lenders like Asian Develop-
ment Bank or the World Bank – allowed its i-
nancing to be used for Indonesia’s coal-ired 
power plant projects.
As the AIIB appears to be set to providing fund-
ing for big-ticket energy and transport infra-
structure projects, doubts persist about whether 
sustainable development goals will be ham-
strung by unwarranted, unit policies which fail 
to protect communities and their environment 
from the predictable, well-documented and irre-
versible harms associated with mega-scale in-
frastructure projects, including fossil fuels.
Similarly, the European countries concerned 
risk forfeiting their relevance by muting their 
agreed climate and energy policy targets to it 
in with AIIB’s intention to help drive forward 
more unabated coal projects at precisely the 
wrong moment. This is unacceptable in the 
wake of the Paris climate summit’s historic 
agreement which many observers have viewed 
as spelling the beginning of the end for the fos-
sil fuels era.
